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Abstract. In the conclusion of [7] Halpern and Moses expressed their interest in a logical system 
in which one could talk about knowledge and belief (and belief about knowledge, knowledge 
about belief and so on), We investigate such systems. In the first part of the paper knowledge 
and belief, without time, are considered. Common knowledge and common belief are defined 
and compared. A logical system and a family of models are proposed, a completeness result is 
proved and a decision procedure described. In the second part of the paper, time is considered. 
Different notions of beliefs are distinguished, obeying different properties of persistence. One 
interpretation of belief which obeys a very strong persistence axiom is put forward and used in 
the analysis of the “wise men” puzzle. 
1. Introduction 
Reasoning about knowledge and belief has been recently proposed as a tool for 
describing distributed systems, as well as many real-life situations. Examples include 
synchronization and cooperation protocols, cryptographic systems, games, 
economics, knowledge bases and intelligent programs. One of the outstanding 
questions is what is the best concept for analysing such situations: knowledge or 
belief. Following previous authors [5] it may be considered that the main difference 
between knowledge and belief is that when one knows p, then p is true, but when 
one believes p, then p must not be true. Some recent works examine the concept of 
knowledge [6,7,9] and others the concept of belief [ 10,2,3]. We think as suggested 
by Halpern and Moses in [7], that for some applications a good system has to be 
able to talk about belief and knowledge. We want to express statements such as 
“person i believes p and knows q”, or “person i believes that if he does not know 
p, then q is true”, and so on. In this paper we propose a logical system for many 
people that includes belief, knowledge, common knowledge and common belief. 
Following Lewis [ll] the notion of common belief of some state of affairs A in a 
population P holds if and only if: 
“(1) everyone in P has reason to believe that A holds; 
(2) A indicates to everyone in P that everyone in P has reason to believe that 
A holds; 
(3) A indicates to everyone in P that everyone in P.. . ” 
Lewis [ 1 l] calls this concept common knowledge, but we think the term common 
belief is more appropriate. The notion of common belief is much weaker than the 
0304-3975/88/$3.50 @ 1988, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland) 
156 S. Kraus. D. Lehmann 
notion of common knowledge. Even when a is true and is common belief, a must 
not be common knowledge. We think that in some cases, in particular those envisaged 
by Lewis, common belief is the proper concept and not common knowledge. 
Another issue is how belief and knowledge are changing in time. In some 
circumstances, one cannot say anything nontrivial about the effect of the passage 
of time on knowledge or belief, but in others one would like to state that knowledge 
is never lost (see [9]) and that beliefs do not change without reason. When discussing 
the relation of belief and time one cannot escape the conclusion that there is more 
than one notion of belief. So, we add “time” to our system and for two different 
notions of belief we suggest different axioms to express the persistence of beliefs 
and common beliefs. 
Finally we use one of our systems to partly analyse the “wise men” puzzle, (see 
[l]) in a completely formal way. 
2. Logic of knowledge and belief 
We now consider knowledge and belief alone (without time). 
2.1. The language 
Suppose a set Pvar of propositional variables and a finite set 
People = def { 1,2, . . . , n} of participants are given. The following rules define the 
set of formulas lY 
(1) A propositional variable p E Pvar is a formula 
If a and b are formulas of r and if i E People, then the following are formulas of I-: 
(2) ia (not a) and a v b (a or b), 
(3) Kia (i knows a) and B,a (i believes a). 
(4) Yta (a is common knowledge) and %?I (a is common belief). 
In this language one can express pure knowledge formulas, pure belief formulas, 
but one can also express formulas like K,a + B,a that means that person i believes 
what he knows, or 1Bia f, K,lB,a that means that person i does not believe a iff 
he knows that he does not believe a. Let us define the connectives Z? and 9 by 
del 
2?a = A K,a, 
it People 
def 
%a = r\ B,a. 
I c People 
The formula 8a means that everybody knows a and 9a means that everybody 
believes a. 
2.2. The models 
We use possible-worlds semantics for knowledge and belief. Person i knows a if 
a is true in all the worlds that according to his knowledge could be possible, and 
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person i believes a if a is true in all the worlds that could be possible according 
to his beliefs. We shall now define models in the style of Kripke with two binary 
relations for each person: one relation corresponding to worlds possible according 
to knowledge, and the other relation corresponding to the worlds believed possible. 
Definition 2.1. A model JZ? is a structure (S, s, 1, =, , -2, . . . , =,,, -, , -2, . . , -,) 
where 
(1) S is a set, elements of S will be called states; 
(2) s E S is the real state of the world; 
(3) 1:s+2p”“’ says which of the propositional variables are true in each state; 
(4) for every i E People, the relations si and si satisfy the following rules: 
(a) =, is an equivalence relation (reflexive, transitive and symmetric), 
(b) -i is serial (for all s E S there is some f E S such that s -, t), 
(c) -I is contained in =; (-, G =,), 
(d) foranys,t,uESifs=,tand t-iu,thens-,u. 
The intuitive meanings of the relations -i and --; are the following. Two states 
s, u E S are in relation si if the knowledge of person i cannot enable him to 
distinguish between s and u. Two states s, u are in relation -; if in states s person 
i believes that state u is a state the world could be in. The relation si is an equivalence 
relation and its intuitive meaning is that all the states in S are divided into equivalence 
classes, and if person i is in state u E S and if u is member of the equivalence class 
E L S, then all the states that are member of E (including u) are possible according 
to his knowledge. 
In every state that person i could be in, there is at least one state that he believes 
is possible, and therefore -i is serial. 
It is easier to believe something than to know it, because one knows only true 
things. So one’s beliefs can enable him to distinguish between more states than 
one’s knowledge, and therefore there could be some states s, u E S such that s =, u 
but s 7Li u. On the other hand, one believes in what one knows and therefore -I is 
contained in si. The interesting condition of the relations =i and --; is condition 
d. This condition means that if s, t, u E S, if s, t are both possible according to the 
knowledge of person i, and if, when he is in state t, he believes that u is possible, 
he also believes that u is possible when he is in state s, since he cannot distinguish 
between t and s. 
We may prove some basic properties of -,. 
Lemma 2.2. zi is euclidean and transitive. 
Proof. Suppose s, t, u E S and s -i t and s -i u. In order to prove that li is euclidean 
we have to prove that t -i u. Ifs -, t, then t =; s because ^ I, is contained in =i and 
-, is symmetric. However s -i u, therefore t -, u by condition (4)(d) in Definition 
2.1. 
158 S. Kraus, D. Lehmann 
Suppose s, t, u E S and s -i t and t -i 1.4. In order to prove that -i is transitive 
we have to prove that s -, u. If s -i t, then s = f t because -i is contained in = i. 
However t -i u and we may conclude that s -i u by condition (4)(d) in Definition 
2.1. 0 
Let us now define two other binary relations corresponding to the connectives = i 
and ^li: 
where + represents transitive closure. It is easy to see that =* is also reflexive and 
symmetric because every = i is reflexive and symmetric. Therefore =* is an 
equivalence relation. On the contrary, - * is transitive but not necessarily reflexive 
or symmetric. Suppose now that a model JZX =(S, s, 1, =,, Ed,. . , -,,, 
--I> -2,. . . , -n ) is given. For any state u we shall define the truth value of any 
formula a E lY 
Definition 2.3. If p E Pvar, then p($ = trueap E Z(u). For formulas a and b of r, 
ia]“, = true e ~2\,‘~, = false, 
a v bl,> = true e aI;{ = true or bl”, = true, 
K+l,y, = true e for all states t such that u =; t, one has al’,, = true, 
BiaI”, = true e for all states t such that u -i t, one has ~1,‘~~ = true, 
Xull;, = true ti for all states t such that u = * t, one has ~1.;~ = true, 
%ul~, = true e for all states t such that u -* t, one has u],!~, =true. 
The definition above is clearly a correct definition by induction on the structure 
of the formula a. Satisfaction and validity will now be defined in the usual way. 
Definition 2.4. Let JU be a model as above and a a formula of lY We say that J! 
satisfies a and write &!=a iff ul;l = true. 
Definition 2.5. A formula a is valid (+ a) iff it is satisfied by all models. 
2.3. The logics 
Our logics are best viewed as composed of a number of levels. The first level 
concerns classical propositional calculus: 
(AO) A suitable axiomatization of the propositional calculus; 
(RO) (Modus Ponens) If +a and +a + b then +b. 
The second level concerns general truths about knowledge and common knowledge 
as found in [9] (+ associates to the right): 
(Al) K,(a+b)+K,u+K,b for any iEPeople; 
Knowledge, belief and rime 159 
(A2) Kia + a for any i E People; 
(A3) lK,a + K,lK,a for any i E People; 
(A4) X(a+b)+Xu+Yib; 
(A5) Xa + K,a for any i E People; 
(A6) Xa + KJCa for any i E People; 
(A7) ?“(a+ &~)+a+%-u; 
(Rl) common knowledge generalization: if t-a, then EXa. 
The third level concerns general truths about belief and common belief: 
(AS) B,(a + 6) + B,a + Bib for any i E People (what person i believes is closed 
under Modus Ponens); 
(A9) lB,false for any i E People (person i does not believe contradictory things); 
(AlO) %‘(a + 6) -+ %u --, Sib (common belief is closed under Modus Ponens); 
(Al 1) %u + 9a (if something is common belief, then everybody believes it); 
(A12) %?a + %%a (if something is common belief, then everybody believes that 
it is common belief); 
(A13) B(a -+ Su)-+ %I + L&J (induction rule). 
The lust and most interesting level describes the interrelation between knowledge 
and belief, and betweeen common knowledge and common belief. 
(A14) K,a + B,a for any i E People (one believes everything one knows); 
(A15) B,a+KiB,a for any iE People (one knows about his own beliefs: beliefs 
are conscious); 
(A16) YCa + 93~1 (anything that is common knowledge is common belief). 
Axiom (A16) is needed to ensure that theorems are common beliefs. We want to 
emphasize that the interesting formula B,a + B,K,a is not included in our system. 
It would imply tB,ut,K,a. 
We now list some interesting theorems that can be proved from the axioms above 
and will be used later: 
K,la + lB,a for any i E People, 
B,a - K,B,a for any i E People, 
lBia - K;lB,u for any i E People, 
K,a c-, B, K,u for any i E People, 
lK,a H B;~K,u for any i E People, 
B,b*B,B;b, K,b f-, K,K,b for any iE People, 
lB,a - BilBiu for any i E People, 
B,(B,a + a) for any i E People, 
53~2 -3 939a, Ba f, 9%3a, EBa + CB%?Zla, 93a c-, 93Ba, 
X(a A b)+-.%!a A Xb, 93(anb)t,Bur,LBb. 
CT11 
CT21 
(T3) 
(T4) 
(T5) 
(T6) 
(T7) 
(Tg) 
(T9) 
(TlO) 
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Theorem2.6. Axioms (AO)-(A16) and the rules of inference (RO)-(Rl) are sound 
and complete for the notion of validity defined above and validity may be decided in 
deterministic exponential time. 
Proof. The proof of the soundness is obvious. The completeness result proceeds by 
building a “universal” model, i.e., a model in which states are labelled by traces of 
suitable size in such a way that formulas true at state s are exactly those formulas 
that appear in the label of s. This proof is similar to the corresponding proof in 
[12], but is different in some interesting details. Some standard notions, such as 
complete and consistent theory are supposed to be known: see, for example, [12] 
for definitions. First we shall define a set of formulas to be considered. 
Remark: In all the following definitions i E People and i is implicitly universally 
quantified. 
Definition 2.7. If a E r, we define A(a) to be the smallest subset of r satisfying: 
(a) a E A(a); 
(b) A(a) is closed under subformulas; 
(c) if b E A (a) and b does not begin by a negation, then lb E A (a); 
(d) if KibEA(a), then BibEd and B,KjbEA(a); 
(e) if XbEA(a), then K,XbEA(a), K,bEA(a) and CBbEA(a); 
(f) if SIbEd( then B@bEA(a) and B,bEA(a). 
It is easy to see that the size of A (a) is linear in the length of a. 
Now, we want to restrict our attention to those subsets of r that are reasonable 
candidates for labels. 
Definition 2.8. Let E c r be closed under subformulas. DE E is a standard set on 
E if it satisfies: 
(a) if 1bE E, 1bE Deba D; 
(b) ifbvcEE,thenbvcEDebEDorcED; 
(c) if K,bE D, then bE D, B,bE D and B,K,bE D; 
(d) if K,B,bE E and B,bE D, then K,B;bE D; 
(e) if B,K,b E D, then K,b E D; 
(f) if Xb E D, then 93b E D, K,YCb E D and Kib E D; 
(g) if %b E D, then B&3336 E D and Bib E D. 
The sets in which all beliefs are true are of special interest. 
Definition 2.9. F c r is a normal set if it satisfies: if B,b E F, then b E F. 
We now define two binary relations between subsets of r 
Definition 2.10. Let D, and D, be subsets of r We say that D, -; D2 iff 
(a) D2 is normal; 
(b) for all bET, BibE D,eB,bE D2. 
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Definition 2.11. Let D, and O2 be subsets of lY We say that D, ci O2 iff 
(a) for all b E r, B;b E D,@Bib E D2; 
(b) for all beT, K,bED,@K,bED,. 
Using the theorems that were mentioned before, it is easy to prove that if T, G r 
and T,G r are consistent and complete theories, then 
(1) TI and T2 are standard sets on r; 
(2) T,~~T,iff forall bEr,K,bET,jbET,; 
(3) T, -i T, iff for all bET, BibE T,-bE T2. 
We may prove general properties about the relations -i and = ;. 
Lemma 2.12. The relations =i and -i defined in Dejinitions 2.10 and 2.11 have the 
following properties: 
(a) -i is an equivalence relation (reflexive, transitive and symmetric). 
(b) Zf E c r is closed under subformulas, and D, and D, are standard sets on E, 
then if D, -, D,, then D, =;DD2; 
(c) For any D,, D,, D, subsets of r, if D, = i D2 and D, -, D,, then D, zi D3. 
Proof. (a): Obvious. 
(b): Suppose there exist D,, D, subsets of E such that D, -i D2. We have to 
prove that D, and D, satisfy the conditions of Definition 2.11. Condition (a) is 
obvious by condition (b) of the definition of -;. For condition (b) K,b E D, iff 
BiKjb E DI since D, is a standard set, B,K,b E D, iff B,K,b E Dz since D, -i D,, and 
B,K,b E D2 iff K,b E D, since D, is a standard set. 
(c): We have to prove that for any D, , D2, D, subsets of r if D, si Dz and 
Dz-;D,, then D, -i D3. D, is normal because D2 -i D3. Bib E D, ti Bib E D2 since 
D, Ei D,. But if B,b E D,, then Bib E D, since D2 -i D,. 0 
We want to remark that the restrictions of =, and -, on a subset of r keep the 
properties of Lemma 2.12. 
Lemma 2.13. Let D, and D, be subsets of r. If E g r is closed under subformulas, then 
(a) D,=;D2 iflD,nE =,D,nE; 
(b) D, -i D, $TD,nE -,D,nE. 
Proof. Obvious. 0 
We shall now define an iteration process of elimination on the standard sets on 
A(a). The main goal of this process is to reach a situation in which we are left with 
a group of traces which can be used in constructing a universal model. 
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Definition 2.14. For all 2 2 0 we define a set W, of standard sets on A (a): W,, is the 
set of the standard sets on A(a). For 12 0, let W ,+, consists of all those D’s E W, 
that satisfy 
(1) there exists a D, E W, such that D -, D, ; 
(2) for I&b E A(a) if Kib G D, then there exists a D, E W, such that D si D, and 
b&D,; 
(3) for Bib E A(a) if Bib& D, then there exists a D, E W, such that D -, D, and 
be D,; 
(4) for Ytb E A (a) if Xb & D, then there exists a k 2 0 and for all 0 <j G k there 
exists a D,EW, such that D=D,, D,-g,Dj+, forj=O,...,k-l,g,EPeople and 
bE Dk; 
(5) for 93b E A (a) if 93b & D, then there exists a k 2 0 and for all 0 <j s k there 
existsaD,EW,suchthatD=D,, D,-,,D,+,forj=O,...,k-l,gj~People,and 
b&D,. 
Clearly, from the finiteness of W0 there is some i0 where this construction closes 
up, i.e., for every j> iO, Wj = Wk. Accordingly, we set W = Wh. The main results 
concerning W are the following: 
Lemma 2.15. For any D c A (a) if there exists some consistent and complete theory T 
such that D= TnA(u), then DE W. 
Proof. We show, by induction on k, that such a set is in “ur, for every k. 
Basis step (k = 0): It is obvious from the axiomatic system and the theorems 
above and by [ 12, Lemma I] that any such D G A(u) is a standard set. 
Induction step (k > 0): We have to prove that any DE “ur,_, such that there exists 
some consistent and complete theory T and D = T n A (a) satisfies the conditions 
of Definition 2.14 with I = k - 1. 
(1): Let 
F y {b 1 Bib E D} u {Bib 1 Bib E D} u {lB,c [ lB,c E D}. 
We shall prove that the theory F is consistent. Suppose that F is inconsistent. Then 
thereareformulasBibjED,j=l ,_.., n;~Bic,ED,I=l ,..., manddkrk=l ,..., p 
suchthatBid,EDfork=l,...,pand 
E-Bib, A B,b, A . . . A Bibn A lBic, A lB,c, A * . . A lB,c, 
+l(d,~d~A...Ad~). 
It follows that 
t-Bi[Bib, A Bib2 A . . . A Bib,, A lB,c, A lBic, A . * . A lB;c, 
+(d,~d~A...Ad~)] 
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by (Rl), (A16) and (All). Then 
tB,Bibi A BiB,b2 A ’ . . A B,Bib, A B,lBic, A BilB;c, A . . * A B,lBic, 
+ B,l( d, A d2 A . . . A d,) 
by (AS), (TlO). B,b, E D and lB,c, E 0, therefore 
B;B,b, A B,B,b, A . . . A B,B,b, A B,lBic, A. . . A BilBic, E T 
by (T6), (T7) and by [ 12, Lemma 11. We can conclude that B,l(d, A c2 A . . . A d,,) E T. 
But Bid,ED, j=l,. . . , p and therefore Bid, E T, j = 1,. . . , p, and it follows that 
Bi(d, A d, A. * . A d,,) E T, contradiction. So F is a consistent theory and it may be 
completed by [12, Lemma l(d)] to a consistent and complete theory T’. Let 
D, zdef T’n A(a). By the induction hypothesis, D, E ‘lVk_, . We shall now show that 
D-, D, , i.e., satisfies the conditions of Definition 2.10. 
First if Bib E 0, then, by the definition of F, B,b E F and Bib E T’ and B,b E D, 
because Bib E A (a). Suppose, on the contrary, that B,b G D; we have to distinguish 
between two different cases: If Bib @ A (a), then B,b G D, . But if Bib E A (a) - 0, then 
lB,b E D (lB,b E A(u) and D is standard set) and iBib E F (by the definition of 
F) and iBib E D,. 
It remains to be shown that D, is normal, i.e., satisfies the condition of Definition 
2.9. Suppose Bib E D,, then Bib E D (as proved just above) and b E F by the definition 
of F; therefore, b E D, . 
(2): Let Kib E A(u) such that KibE D. If the theory 
def 
R = {K,c(K,cE D}u{lKid]lKid E D}u{BieJB,e~D} 
u (1Bf 1 lBid E D} u {lb} 
is consistent, then it may be completed to a satisfactory T, by [12, Lemma l(d)] 
and we may define D, =def Tl n A(u) as in the previous case. Suppose R is incon- 
sistent. Then there are formulas K,c, E D, j = 1,. . . , n; iKid, E D, I = 1,. . , m; 
B,ek E 0, k = 1, . . . ,p and lB,f,ED, g=l,..., q and 
E-K~c, A . . . A Kit, A lK,d, A. . . A iKid,,, A B,e, A. . . A B,e,, 
A lBifl A. . * A lB,f,+ 6. 
It follows that 
kK,[Kic, A * . . A Kit, A lK,d, A. . . A lKid,,, A Bie, A. * *B;e, 
A lB,f, A. . . A lB,f, + b] 
by (Rl) and (A5). Then 
t-K;K,c, A. . . A KiKic, A KiTKid, A. . . A KiTKid, A K,B,e, A. . . A K,B,e, 
A KilB,f, A. . . A KilBfq + Kib 
by (Al) and (TlO). 
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Since D = T n A(u) and K,c, E 0, j = 1,. . . , n; iKid E D, I= 1,. . . , m; Biek E 0, 
k=l,... , p and lB& E 0, g = 1,. . . , q, we can conclude, using [12, Lemma 11, 
that K,K,c, E T,j = 1,. . . , n; K,lK,d, E T, I = 1,. . . , m (by (A3) and (T6)), K,B,e, E T, 
k=l,... ,p (by (T2)); KilBfk E T, g = 1,. . . , q (by (T3)). Therefore, K,b E T, a 
contradiction. 
(3): Similar to the proof of (2) and simpler. 
(4): Suppose that .7Cb E A(a) and Xb & D. We may define 
and we have to prove that there exists an F’ E 9 such that b EZ F. If G is a subset 
of r, we define the characteristic formula of G by xG =def AOEG a. The characteristic 
formula XG is not in general in G, but it is easy to prove that for any consistent 
and complete theory T, G = T n A( a)e,yc E T. We may define +!I =def VFp9 xF. 
Notice that for any consistent and complete theory T, T n A(a) E 9e $ E T. We 
have to prove that C$ + jji K& Suppose not. Then there is a consistent and complete 
theory S such that Ic, E S and A\iKilC, .@ S. It follows that there exists aj E People such 
that K,I,!J E S; therefore there exists a consistent and complete theory S’ and S =j S’ 
and 4 @ S’. We may conclude that S’n A(a) $9. But S zj S’ and therefore S n 
A(a) EjS’nA(u) by Lemma 2.13, and SnA(u)E9 and we may conclude that 
S’ n A (a) E 9. A contradiction.(*) 
So, from F$ + /ji K,$ it follows that t-X[+ + /ji Ki$] by (Rl), and by using the 
induction rule (A7) we may conclude that +tJ + XI,!J. But txD + 4 because DE 9; 
therefore txD + XI+!J. 
Now we may finish the proof that there exists an F’E 9 such that b & F. Suppose 
that VF E 9, b E F. It follows that t$ + b; then tX$ + Xb and t-,yD + Xb; but 
x0 E T and then Ytb E T and we may conclude that Xb E D, contradiction. 
(5): Suppose that 9336 E A (a) and Bb @ D. The beginning of the proof is similar 
to the proof of the previous case till (*) by replacing = i by -i, X by 93 and K, by 
Bi. So, from EI,/+A~ Bi$ it follows that FCB[+-A~ Bi$] by (Rl) and (A16), and 
by using the induction rule (A13) we may conclude that t/ji B,$ + 93$. 
We have to prove that +xD + B& Suppose not. Then B,$E T since xD E T. 
Therefore there exists a consistent and complete theory T’ and T -i T’ and $ & T’. 
We may conclude that T’ n A (a ) @ 9. But T -i T’ and therefore T n A (U ) - i T’ n 
A(u) by Lemma 2.13, and TnA(u)c9 and we may conclude that T’nA(u)EB, 
a contradiction. 
So, FX~+ /ji Bi$ and k/j; Bill,+ ?&,!I; therefore, F-_x[,+ a+, and we may finish 
the proof as in the previous case. 0 
Lemma 2.16. The restrictions of the relations si and -i on W have the following 
properties: 
(1) all the properties of Dejinition 2.1: 
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(a) =, is an equivalent relation (reflexive, transitive and symmetric), 
(b) -i is serial ($or all s E W there is some t E W such that s -I t). 
(c) -i is contained in si (-in cz), 
(d) for any s, t, u E W ifs Ei t and t -i U, then s -i u; 
(2) for K,b E A(a) if Kib E D, then there exists a D, E W such that D =, D, and 
bG D,; 
(3) for Bib E A (a) if B,b G D, then there exists a D, E W such that D -, D, and 
be D,; 
(4) for Xb E A (a) ifXb g D, then there exists k 2 0 and for all 0 <j s k there exists 
aD,EWsuchthatD=D,,D,-,,D,+,forj=O ,..., k-l,g,EPeople,andb&DD,; 
(5) for Bb E A(a) if 6Bb & D, then there exists a k > 0 and for all 0~ j 4 k there 
existsa D,EWsuch that D=D,,, D,-,,D,+, forj=O,...,k-1, gigPeople, and 
bE Dk. 
Proof. Properties (a), (c), and (d) were proved in Lemma 2.12. Properties (b) and 
(2)-(5) are straightforward from the construction of W in Definition 2.14. 0 
Proof of Theorem 2.6. (continued). The completeness proof now proceeds in the 
following way: suppose that bLa; we shall build a model that does not satisfy a. 
First, by [ 12, Lemma 1 (e)] there is a consistent and complete theory T, that contains 
la. From Lemma 2.15, D, = T, nA(a) is in W. The model A = 
(S, s, 1, =,, -2,. . . ) = n, -,, -*, . . .) - ,,) that does not satisfy a is defined in the 
following way: 
(1) s= w, 
(2) s=D,, 
(3) ~(D)={PIPED), 
(4) zi and -i are defined as in Definitions 2.10 and 2.11. 
Our main result concerning the model A is the following lemma. 
Lemma2.17. LetbEA(a) andsEW; thenblf,=trueGbbS. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of b. 
Case b =p: 
pi”, = true CJ p E l(s) by the definition of the model. 
Case b = lc: lc E se c@ s (since s is a standard set) e CITY, = false by the 
induction hypothesis. 
Caseb=cvd:cvdEs~cCsordEs(sincesisastandardset)~cl,~~,=trueor 
d 1% = true by the induction hypothesis. 
Case b = Kit: Kit E s+K,c E t for all 1 E W such that s -< t by the definition of 
Ei JC E t since t is standard *cl,‘, = true by the induction hypothesis. Suppose 
now that K,c& s. Since K,CE A(a) it follows by condition 2 of Lemma 2.16 that 
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there exists a t E 22’ such that s = i t and b E t and we may conclude by the induction 
hypothesis that bl!, = false. 
Case b = BiC: B;c E s+Bic E t for all t E W such that s -i t by the definition of 
-i 3 c E t since t is a normal set *cl .>( = true by the induction hypothesis. The other 
direction is like the previous case by condition (3) of Lemma 2.16. 
Case b = Xc: Suppose YCc E s. We have to prove that, for any g z 0 and for any 
sO~ sI,. . .Y sj,--. 7 sg7 if sjE ?@“, j=O ,..., g; s=sg, sj =k,s,+* for j=O ,..., g-1, 
k, E People, then c E ss. Xc E sj; therefore, K,,%c E sj since 3 is standard; then 
XCESj,,. But XCES,; therefore XCE su and c E s, since sp is standard. By the 
induction hypothesis we may conclude that cl”; = true. The opposite direction is 
similar to the previous case by condition (5) of Lemma 2.16. 
Case b = Bc: Similar to the previous case. 0 
Proof of Theorem 2.6 (conclusion). So we can finish the proof of the completeness 
by concluding that .&#a. q 
3. Time 
We may now extend our logic to capture time by adding new modal operators 
to the language. The new operators are 0 (next), 0 (always) and Until (until). 
We think that when talking about how beliefs are changing in time, one must 
distinguish between at least two different notions of belief. First, belief can mean 
readiness to bet. “Person i believes that this afternoon it will rain” means, 
operationally, that he will take his raincoat with him in the morning. If it does not 
rain, no problem, he will be slightly inconvenienced by having to take his raincoat 
back and forth. But a second acceptation is possible, in which belief is a much more 
serious matter. One cannot allow reality to contradict one’s beliefs because that 
would be too traumatic an experience. Therefore one may believe only things that 
may not, ever, under any circumstances, be shown to be false. One may not believe 
that it will rain because he could come to know that his belief was erroneous and 
he does not want to take that chance. One may believe things that one knows to be 
true or things that cannot be proven false. For example, one may believe the 
Continuum Hypothesis (or its negation) since its negation is not a theorem of set 
theory. This meaning of belief is perhaps close to the meaning of religious belief. 
So, talking about this last meaning of belief (the “serious” meaning), if person i 
believes that something will be true tomorrow, it must be that he knows that he will 
not discover tomorrow that it is wrong. Therefore the following axiom seems 
reasonable for this second interpretation: 
(A17) B,Oa + K,OlK,la for any iE People. 
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Now, if person i believes that tomorrow a will be true, since he cannot find tomorrow 
that he is wrong, he has all the reasons to persist in his beliefs and we may accept 
(Al8) B,Oa + OB,a for any in People. 
If (A18) is accepted, one can also accept 
(A19) !33Oa -+ 0%~. 
Now one may notice that (A17) is provable from (A18) and forget (A17). Fagin 
and Halpern in [2] argue that (A18) “is moving us away from our goal of capturing 
realistic notions of belief”. Indeed, in everyday life, the verb “believe” is probably 
used with a meaning of the type “readiness to bet”. A logical, nonnumeric, convincing 
treatment of such a notion is problematic. 
In such an interpretation of belief, (the “weak” meaning) axioms (A18) and (A19) 
do not seem reasonable. Somebody may believe (in the “weak” meaning) that it 
will rain tomorrow, but tomorrow he will not believe so. Nevertheless, if one believes 
that tomorrow a is true, one believes (today) that tomorrow one will continue to 
believe a. Therefore we propose the axiom (for the first interpretation): 
(A20) B,Ou + B,OB,u for any in People. 
This axiom says nothing about the future and we need some more expressive axiom 
to capture what happens to our beliefs in time. No one likes to change his beliefs, 
and one shall change them only if one is forced to do so. For example, somebody 
who drove to his office in the morning and left his car in the parking lot believes 
that his car is in the parking lot and in good mechanical condition. He will continue 
to believe it unless a friend of his calls him to tell him that his car has been damaged 
by another car or has been stolen. Then he stops believing that his car is in the 
parking lot, and he knows the opposite. We want to say that if person i believes 
something, he will keep on believing it until he knows it is false. The way to say so 
is: 
(A21) B,Ou + OB,u v OK,lu for any i E People. 
The following is provable from A21, but weaker: 
(A22) BiOu + OB,u v OB,lu for any i c People. 
The meaning of this axiom is that one stops believing in something when one believes 
it is false. For example, does the driver (from the previous example) know that his 
car was damaged?! He did not see his car, and maybe his friend was joking?! 
An open problem is: find a natural family of models for which the systems 
considered above are complete. 
The ways by which common knowledge and common belief may be achieved in 
a distributed environment are fundamentally different. Halpern and Moses [6] 
proved that, in order for common knowledge to be attainable in a system, the system 
must be capable of simultaneity. This limitation is a direct consequence of the 
168 S. Kraus, D. Lehmann 
following theorem: Yta *K,.XL for all i E People. On the contrary, the formula: 
B,!Z’u + 6%~ is not valid. Note that %3a ++ .%%a is valid. Therefore it could be that 
q B,%3a and OUB,%u and OOClB,% . . . and at instant n (n = IPeople]) ?F%u will 
be true and will be common belief. We just described a system in which common 
belief is gained and which is not capable of simultaneity. Similarly, in a system in 
which, at first, a is common belief, but later on, agent i stops believing a is common 
belief, common belief is lost, without any simultaneity being necessary. We may 
conclude that common belief seems a more realistic notion than common knowledge, 
which can be attainable without simultaneity. 
4. The puzzle of the wise men 
As an example of the possible use of the logic of belief, common belief and time 
(without knowledge), we provide a new analysis of the puzzle that was analysed in 
[9]. We use the system that includes a suitable axiomatization of the temporal logic 
of linear time (see [4]), the axioms (A8)-(A13) and (A19), the rules of inference 
(RO) and a common belief generalization rule: if tu, then t!%‘u. 
We think that axiom (A19) seems very reasonable since common belief is a strong 
notion. Therefore, if it is common belief that tomorrow a will be true, it seems 
reasonable that tomorrow a will be common belief. 
The puzzle could be told the following way. Once upon a time, the happy chairman 
of the Computer Science Department at Utopia University was told by the President 
that the good financial situation of the university allowed for some pay increases 
in his department. The chairman decided to distribute the pay increases among his 
three professors in a way that would provide for both fun and justice. He asked all 
three professors to a room and showed them five hats: two white hats and three 
black hats. He told them: at exactly 12:00 noon I will turn off the light and place 
a hat on each of your three heads; you are not allowed to put those hats off your 
head; I will destroy the two remaining hats and will not know myself which of the 
hats have been destroyed; then I will leave the room and switch the light on; at 
1:00 p.m. I will come back and ask whether somebody can tell the colour of his 
hat; a wrong answer means unemployment, a correct answer means a large pay 
increase; if one (at least) of you speaks at 1:00 p.m., then the game is finished; if 
nobody speaks at that time, then I will come back at 2:00 p.m. and ask the same 
question but offer only a smaller pay increase to anybody who can tell the colour 
of his hat; this will go on at each hour (for decreasing financial rewards) until one 
of you speaks up. The chairman did as he said, left the room and switched the light 
on. As soon as he sat down in his office a telephone call from his wife asked him 
in no uncertain terms to be home at 2:30 p.m. to greet her parents. He agreed. The 
question is: how did the chairman know he could leave the university in time, i.e., 
that he would not have to be back for the 3:00 p.m. visit to his staff? 
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It should be pointed out that the chairman cannot indeed exclude a possible 
cooperation between his professors but he cannot either count on such a cooperation, 
things being as they are. 
Of interest to us in this puzzle are both the kind of reasoning used by the professors 
and the chairman, and the exact list of all assumptions hidden in this puzzle. The 
notion of common belief will prove itself useful in both respects. We think that this 
analysis of the puzzle is sharper and more realistic than the analysis using common 
knowledge that was provided in [9], and we may compare them later. For the 
description of the, sometimes hidden, assumptions and the participants’ reasoning 
we shall use the following basic propositions (propositional variables). To minimize 
propositional variables, we build some of the assumptions in the interpretation of 
those variables. It would not be difficult to state exactly those assumptions by using 
some more variables. The professors will be numbered 1, 2, 3. The instants of time 
considered are 12:00 noon, 1:00 p.m., 2:00 p.m. and so on. We use the propositional 
variable b, to mean “professor i has, now, a black hat on his head”, and wi to mean 
“professor i has, now, a white hat on his head”. For i = 1,. . . ,3 we use the 
propositional variable d, to mean “professor i declares, now, the colour of his hat”. 
We shall also use the following notations: 
def def 
a , = V bi, a2 = (b, v bd A (b, v bd A (b, v b,), 
,=I,. .,3 
def 
a s= A h. 
i; I,...,3 
the formula uk means “there are at least k black hats”. 
We now proceed to describe the assumptions of the puzzle. Assumption 1 is that 
it is common belief that one has either a black hat or a white hat. 
(CBWB) %‘Cl(lbit, wi) for i = 1,. . . ,3. 
This assumption is weaker than the corresponding hidden assumption in [9]. In [9] 
the assumptions that lb, is equivalent to wi is built in the description of the puzzle 
and therefore it is common knowledge that hats are either black or white; here 
however it is only common belief. Therefore one of the hats could be yellow. 
Assumption 2 is that it is common belief that hats do not change colours and do 
not move from one head to another. 
(CBHI) Bi7(b,-Obi)A .?ZO(w,-Ow,) for i=l, . . .,3. 
The similar assumption (HI) from [9] is much stronger than this one. In (CBHI) 
the professors believe that the hats do not change colours and do not move from 
one head to another and that everyone believes that hats do not change colours and 
so on, but they do not know it and it could also be that it is not true. 
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Assumption 3 is that it is common belief that no professor is blind, i.e. every 
professor believes he sees the color of the hat of each of his colleagues. It does not 
mean that one of the professors could not be color blind and maybe he does not 
know the real color of the hats, but he believes that he sees the right color and this 
fact is common belief. 
(CBNB) ~U(bj~Bibj)A~O(Wj~BiWj) for i=l,..., 3, j=l,..., 3, i#j. 
Assumption 4 expresses that a professor declares the colour of his hat to be white 
only when he believes the colour of his hat is white (respectively black); on the 
other hand, he will declare as soon as he can after he has come to believe the colour 
of his hat to be white (respectively black). To simplify matters a little bit and to 
avoid introducing the Until connective in our formulas, we assume that once a 
professor declares the colour of his hat, he goes on declaring it at every subsequent 
instant (hour). 
(CBSR) ?7J17(B,bi v B,w,oOd,) for i = 1,. . . ,3 
This axiom is not weaker than (SR) from [9]. Here a professor does not wait until 
he knows the colour of his hat, as in (SR), but in our version this is only common 
belief and not common knowledge. 
Assumption 5 expresses that the fact for a participant to speak up, or, more 
important, to stay quiet, is public enough to create common belief. In other words, 
whether a professor speaks up or not is immediately common belief. 
(ND1)O(~3dit,di)~Cl(~ld,t,ld,) for i=1,...,3. 
(NDl) is the only axiom that considers the reality. All the others assumed certain 
common beliefs. 
Our last assumption (assumption 6) is that it is common belief that, at 12:00 noon, 
there is at least one professor donning a black hat: 
(CBTWH)%, . 
Our claim about the puzzle is that if nobody speaks up at 1:00 p.m. or at 2:00 p.m., 
then every single professor will speak up at 3:00 p.m. In particular, the chairman 
knows that a final decision will, at the latest, be made at 2:Ol p.m. formally, we claim 
F(ND~) A (CBWB) A (CBHI) A (CBSR) A (CBTWH) A (CBNB) 
i=1J,, Odi v V 004 v A OOOdj- 
, .3 i=1,...,3 i= I,...,3 
We want to remark that we do not prove anything about how the professors acquire 
their beliefs, and when the professors will not speak. Even in the case all the three 
professors have black hats ((-u,), we prove that at least one of the professors will 
speak till 3:00, but we are not able to prove, using our system, that no one will 
speak before this time. It could be that one of them will start believing the colour 
of his hat white (respectively black) before 2:00, by e.s.p. for example. Building a 
Knowledge, belief and time 171 
logical system which puts genera1 sensible restriction on the way one acquires beliefs 
is an open problem. 
The proof is done in three main parts. First we prove that it is common belief 
that at 1:00 p.m. if it is common belief that no one speaks up, then it is common 
belief that there are at least two black hats. In the second part we prove that it is 
common belief that at 1:00 p. m. if it is common belief that there are at least two 
black hats, then if at 2:00 p.m. it is common belief that no one speaks up, then at 
2:00 it will be common belief that at 3:00 p.m everybody will speak up. In the parts 
of the proof described above we use only the assumptions that begin with common 
belief ((CBHI), (CBSR), (CBTWH), (CBNB), (CBWB)) and not assumption (NDl) 
that considers reality. We use this last axiom only in the third part when we prove 
our final claim by putting our results from the previous parts together. 
The main stages of the proof will be described. 
(CBNB) + %I(~;+Biwj) for i=l,..., 3,j=l,..., 3, i#j, (1) 
(CBTWH) A (CBNB) A (CBWB) + %‘(w, A wk + Bibi) (2) 
for i=l,..., 3, j=l,..., 3, k=l,..., 3, i Zj, j # k, k # i. This follows from (1). 
Now we have 
(CBSR)A(CBTWH) A(CBNB)A (CBWB) + 3 lLy2+ v od, 
> 
, 
i= I,...,3 
(3) 
by (2). 
(CBHI) + %((~,++Ocu,), (4) 
(CBHI) A (CBSR) A (CBTWH) A (CBNB) A (CBWB) 
by (3) and (4). 
(CBHI) A (CBSR) A (CBTWH) A (CBNB) A (CBWB) 
by (5) and axiom (A19). 
(CBHI) A (CBSR) A (CBTWH) A (CBNB) A (CBWB) 
93~d,+93a, , 
> 
(7) 
(5) 
(6) 
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by (6) and axiom (AlO) and (TlO) 
(CBHI) A (CBSR) A (CBTWH) A (CBNB) A (CBWB) 
by (7) and since all the hypotheses begin by !Z. This is the end of the first part of 
our proof. 
(CBWB) + ~~(cx,Aw,+~~) for i=l,..., 3, j=l,...., 3, i#j, (9) 
by propositional calculus. 
(CBWB) + L%(Bicu,~Biwj+Bibi) for i=l,._., 3,j=l,..., 3, i#j, 
(10) 
by (9) and axioms (A8) and (All) and theorems (T9)(TlO). 
(CBWB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) + B(%a, A Wj + Odi) 
for i=l,..., 3,j=l,..., 3, i#j, (11) 
by (lo), (1) and axiom (All). 
(CBWB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (CBHI) 
by (11). 
(CBWB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (CBHI) 
+ cIzv333a, + 930 V wi + V di 3 
i=1,...,3 > 
by (12) and axiom (AlO). 
(CBWB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (CBHI) 
by (13) and (TlO). 
ldi-+a3 , 
> 
(CBWB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (CBHI) 
+ Z&z2 + 0 
( 
3 A ld,+Ba, , 
I =I,...,3 > 
by (14) and axioms (A19) and (AlO). 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
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(CBWB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (CBHI) 
+ Z&r, + 30 
( 
% A ldi+933a, , 
;=1,...,3 > 
by (15), (T9), (AlO) and since all the hypotheses begin by 3. 
(CBSR) + 55’0 33~~~’ /j Od, 
( 
, 
I,...,3 > 
by axiom (All) and since (CBSR) begins by 330. 
(CBWB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (CBHI) 
+%Y,+~O .% 
( 
/j ld,+ /j Odi , 
i=1,...,3 i=1,...,3 > 
by (17) and (16). 
(CBWB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (CBHI) 
+933a,+O A L!hd,+O A CBOd,, 
i=1,...,3 i=L,...,3 
by (18) and axioms (A19), (AIO) and (TlO). 
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(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(CBWB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (CBHI) 
/j 9hdi+0 /‘j BOdi , 
> 
(20) 
r=l, ..,3 r=l, . ..3 
by (19) and since all the hypotheses begin by 90. This is the end of the second 
part of our proof. 
Now putting together (8) and (20): 
(CBWB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (CBHI) 
+ 530 A %hd,+O A ?hdi+O /j 
( 
BOd, 
t=1,...,3 i= I,...,3 I= I,...,3 > 
(CBwB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (CBHI) 
(21) 
+ 093 r\ 931di + 030 A Shd;+ A LBOdi), (22) 
i=1,...,3 i= I,...,3 i=1,...,3 
by (21) and axioms (A19) and (AlO). 
(CBWB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (CBHI) 
+O A ?hd;+OO A %hdi+ A O%di, 
i=1,...,3 !:I,...,3 ,=I,...,3 > 
(23) 
by (22) and axioms (A19), (AlO) and (T9), (t10). 
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(CBWB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (CBHI) 
+O /j SBldi+OO A CBldi+ /j 033di, 
I =I,...,3 ( i=1,...,3 i=1,...,3 > 
by (22) and axioms (A19), (AlO) and theorems (T9), (TlO). 
(CBwB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (cBH1) A (NDI) 
+ /j Oldi + /j OOld; + A OOOdiy 
,=I,...,3 i=1,...,3 ,=I,...,3 
by (23). The proof may now be successfully completed; we get 
(CBWB) A (CBNB) A (CBSR) A (CBHI) A (ND]) 
+ V Od,v V 004 v A OOOd,. 
,=I,...,3 i=1,...,3 I = I,...,3 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
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